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This paper describes a hypothetical scenario of public response to a large re-
gional earthquake on the southern section of the San Andreas Fault. Conclusive
social and behavioral science research over decades has established that the
behavior of individuals in disaster is, on the whole, controlled, rational, and
adaptive, despite popular misperceptions that people who experience a disaster
are dependent upon and problematic for organized response agencies. We
applied this knowledge to portray the response of people impacted by the earth-
quake focusing on actions they will take during and immediately following the
cessation of the shaking including: immediate response, search and rescue, gain-
ing situational awareness through information seeking, making decisions about
evacuation and interacting with organized responders. Our most general conclu-
sion is that the actions of ordinary people in this earthquake scenario comprised
the bulk of the initial response effort, particularly in those areas isolated for
lengthy periods of time following the earthquake. [DOI: 10.1193/1.3575728]
INTRODUCTION: THE SCENARIO
The scenario disaster addressed in this paper is a major earthquake on the southern San
Andreas Fault, a magnitude 7.8 event that ruptures a 300 km length of the fault and impacts
an eight-county region in Southern California (see ShakeMap in Porter et al. 2011, this
volume). This earthquake scenario, the most detailed and carefully constructed to date, esti-
mates that the earthquake would cause 1,800 deaths, 50,000 injuries that require hospitaliza-
tion, displace 255,000 households, and cause $213 billion dollars in direct and indirect dam-
age (Jones et al. 2008). The disaster hypothesized in this scenario would be the worst
natural disaster in American history, striking an urban region populated by more than
20 million people with a building inventory valued at $2 trillion. The hypothesized earth-
quake occurs at 10:00 a.m. on a weekday and assumes that working people are on the job,
school-age children are in the classroom, many are traveling on streets and highways, and
businesses are open with customers present. Upon the occurrence of the scenario earthquake
lasting approximately 2 minutes and causing violent ground motion, buildings will be
severely damaged, utilities disrupted, lifelines severed, and the normal routines of millions
of people will be altered for weeks, months, and years. For additional details of the scenario,
see Porter et al. (2011, this volume). Scenarios ﬁll an important role in shaping public
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policy by detailing the likely consequences of major disruptive events and setting the stage
for measures that improve resiliency through mitigation and preparedness.
SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN DISASTER
In a real sense, this is one earthquake that creates multiple disasters, requires an unprec-
edented level of response, and affects both national and world economies. The impacts will
include severe damage to buildings and infrastructure, disruption of lifelines and utilities,
major secondary hazards, particularly ﬁres, disrupted communications and resulting isola-
tion of some communities for days before organized response will be available. The organ-
ized agencies of response—ﬁre departments, law enforcement agencies, medical emergency
responders, utility and lifeline operators, and agencies at the local, regional, state, and
national levels that coordinate response—will experience difﬁculties and delays in mobiliz-
ing resources and gaining access to areas in need of immediate emergency response. These
delays in response are not due to negligence or lack of competence on the part of organized
response agencies but to the large-scale impacts of this scenario earthquake on Southern
California communities.
In California, when an emergency or disaster exceeds the capacity of a single jurisdic-
tion to effectively respond, mutual aid agreements draw speciﬁc types of assistance from
non- or minimally affected jurisdictions. These mutual aid pacts include ﬁre, law, and emer-
gency management functions, are codiﬁed into law, and are exercised frequently for many
types of emergencies. The catastrophic earthquake scenario hypothesized in this paper
would require mutual aid on an unprecedented scale, from the entire state, adjacent states,
and, for some functions like ﬁre, from the nation as a whole. Organized response on this
scale will require time to mobilize and will face signiﬁcant obstacles to deployment, includ-
ing regional disruption of transportation and communications, damage to airports and har-
bor facilities, uncontrolled ﬁres, and signiﬁcant impacts on local emergency management
agencies that must initiate response as well as assess the situation and clearly identify mu-
tual aid needs.
In the face of the immediate and urgent needs for search and rescue, ﬁre suppression,
debris clearance, medical assistance, and safe shelter, survivors of the earthquake will take
immediate action to address these needs. This response by local residents is immediate,
spontaneous, loosely organized, and represents what social scientists have described as a
transformation of social relations from routine to urgent, from normal self-interested actions
to an emphasis on community survival, and from recipients of emergency assistance to pro-
viders of assistance. What some see as post-disaster chaos is a new set of disaster-speciﬁc
norms that guide human behavior in a crisis (Mileti 1999, Turner 1986, Barton 1969). The
actions for which these norms provide guidance are to save lives that are imperiled, to
reduce suffering, to address immediate threats such as ﬁres and gas leaks, to provide emo-
tional support, to assess and deﬁne the situation, and to plan for the immediate future. This
translates to self-protection, assuring the safety and protection of others in the immediate
environment, including rescuing those who are trapped in debris, reuniting with family,
assisting neighbors, gaining an understanding of the situation through information seeking,
and addressing the issue of whether one may remain in place or move to another, presum-
ably safer location.
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Individuals, families, and neighbors will work in small groups, largely unsupervised, to
respond to the disaster and will use whatever tools are available to them, including the ac-
quisition of resources (sometimes mistakenly labeled as looting) from local businesses to
achieve their goals. They will continue these efforts for hours and days until organized
response personnel appear and in many instances will continue to work alongside organized
responders until fatigue or the need for equipment and expertise, available only to the
trained, takes precedent over their efforts. In general, the emergent public response trails off
as organized responders are available and as relatively easy rescues, the provision of ﬁrst
aid, the suppression of small ﬁres and other needs give way to more complicated rescues,
aid for serious injuries and major ﬁre suppression, beyond the capability of mostly untrained
responders becomes salient (see Figure 1). We do not mean to imply that organized
response is absent immediately following the earthquake (Kreps 1991); initial organized
response will require time to ramp up and in the interim, localized spontaneous response
will address the pressing need for assistance. In addition, emergent activity after the earth-
quake does not cease as those on the fringe of the impact area begin the recovery process
even as organized emergency response supersedes spontaneous emergency actions in the
high impact zones.
In this paper, we will apply this model of human behavior in disaster to the scenario of
a major earthquake in Southern California, a model validated in thousands of studies of dis-
asters of all types worldwide (see summaries in Tierney et al. 2001, Mileti 1999, Drabek
1986). It will challenge many prevailing stereotypes of post-disaster behavior, including
panic and irrational ﬂight during the disaster, dazed and incapacitated dependency after the
event, a lapse into criminal behavior by many, taking advantage of the absence of control
agencies to loot stores or homes, and in general, being a burden to already overtaxed
response agencies struggling to mobilize and address the major impacts of the disaster. In
fact, those who are typically the targets of control in the Social Breakdown Model, poor and
minority people, are actually more likely to be victims, to experience signiﬁcant losses, and
to require longer recovery time than economically advantaged people of the ethnic majority.
Figure 1. Emergent and organized response over time.
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Thus, the purpose of this paper is to provide an evidence-based portrait of human behavior
in disaster that challenges the Social Breakdown Model and provides decision makers a
valid basis for planning and public policy. There is little in this paper that directly contrib-
utes to the social science literature on human behavior in disaster, as social scientists who
study disaster will have heard these conclusions in the past, but many readers from other
disciplines represented in this volume may be unfamiliar with these insights, and it is to
them that this paper is addressed.
SCENARIO GENERATION METHOD
We sought to use a method that would enable us to generate realistic estimates of public
response to the scenario earthquake. The method selected superimposed realistic and docu-
mented accounts of public behavior in past analogous disasters on the impacts imposed by
this earthquake. We implemented the method as follows.
First, we took as our input the output of other scenario groups who estimated the earth-
quake’s impacts, including the number of ﬁre ignitions, damage to buildings and life lines,
disruption and damage to the transportation infrastructure, and much more. We then made
assumptions about what these impacts would mean to the ability of organized emergency
response organizations to respond to the volume of demand for their services, and, perhaps
just as important, for mutual aid response to converge to all the locations in Southern Cali-
fornia that would be in need of service delivery.
Second, we drew on the extensive empirical record, begun over a half-century ago, and
based on disasters from around the world regarding the behavior of members of the public,
both victims and nonvictims. Moreover, several authors have synthesized that research re-
cord including Barton (1969), Mileti et al. (1975, 1999), Drabek (1986), and, most recently,
Tierney et al. (2001). Still others have generalized from these ﬁndings and syntheses to cre-
ate general “empirically validated theory” about human behavior in disasters (Turner 1986).
We extracted repetitive descriptive accounts of public behavior in historical disasters that
comprised this record to hypothesize behaviors in this scenario.
Last, we superimposed the patterns of public response grounded in historically investi-
gated disasters on the scenario damage estimates provided by others to inform the estimates
we made about public response to the scenario earthquake herein reported. This method
was, obviously, inherently qualitative; however, it rested on a strong and elaborate record of
actual empirical ﬁndings about how real people have behaved in real and analogous disas-
ters. All of the behavioral estimates we provide below for this scenario are evidence-based,
that is, we only provide descriptions of public response that have been repetitively docu-
mented in multiple disaster events of like magnitude to the scenario earthquake.
PUBLIC RESPONSE
In the sections that follow, we have selected several post-earthquake actions taken by
people in the impacted area of the M7.8 earthquake scenario. They are the immediate
response to the earthquake shaking, activities involving the rescue of people trapped or
incapacitated by the earthquake, information seeking to deﬁne the situation, making deci-
sions regarding shelter, and taking on other response roles typically performed by the
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organized responders but that, in the initial phase of the disaster, are performed by members
of the public.
INITIAL BEHAVIORAL RESPONSE
By initial behavioral response, we mean the actions taken at the onset of the earthquake,
when a person ﬁrst perceives movement and continuing until the shaking has ceased. These
actions, as characterized over the years have generally fallen into two models of behavior,
the Social Breakdown Model and the Rational-Adaptive Model. The Social Breakdown
Model suggests that the disaster social situation is chaotic, that people faced with sudden
violent shaking will panic, act irrationally by running regardless of the danger that move-
ment may present and ignoring both prior training and situational cues that suggest that
other actions may prevent injury or death. The immediate aftermath of the disaster, accord-
ing to the Social Breakdown Model, is a situation requiring immediate intervention and care
for fearful, traumatized victims and a strong show of control to prevent antisocial behavior
among those who may take advantage of disaster-induced lapses in the exercise of
authority.
One of the clearest statements of the Breakdown Model of panic in disaster is found in a
description of “human reactions” to earthquake shaking by seismologist Charles Richter
(1958):
Fright and panic are such regular effects of strong shaking that they form an
established part of all intensity scales. Persons and populations differ according to
their previous experience, but only an abnormally cold-blooded person can remain
calm when the structures over his head are being damaged and the ground under his
feet is shaking so as to destroy the basic feelings of security. The most universal
impulse is to run, even when already outdoors.
This “common” reaction in situations of potential danger, however, is challenged by
empirical studies of ﬁres, ﬂoods, earthquakes and other natural and technological disasters.
According to the Rational-Adaptive Model, rather than panic, people who experience a sud-
den crisis respond actively and consistently as possible with pre-disaster roles. It is this
model that is supported by decades of social science research on many types of disasters in
different parts of the world. The model has received empirical support in ﬁres where the
response of people was to use familiar exits, assist others and, where possible, to ﬁght the
ﬁre (NIST 2005, Aguirre et al. 1998, Paulsen 1981). Studies of initial behavioral response
in California earthquakes were conducted based on surveys with consistent questions fol-
lowing three earthquakes, Whittier Narrows (M5.9 on 1 October 1987), Loma Prieta (M6.9
on 17 October 1989) and Northridge (M6.7 on 17 January 1994). Goltz (with Russell and
Bourque, 1992; 2006) found that the self-reported behavior of persons who experienced
these earthquakes was, on the whole, controlled, rational, and adaptive and varied with
where they were located at the time of the earthquake, levels of fear, the presence and iden-
tity of others, age, and gender.
In these surveys, respondents were asked: When you felt the earthquake, what was the
very ﬁrst thing you did? Based on responses to this question and analysis in the context of
various situational and demographic variables, Goltz discovered that the modal response of
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persons at home or at work was to avoid hazards, take cover in a doorway (still a recom-
mended action at the time of these earthquakes) or under sturdy furniture and, if driving, to
pull to the side of the road. In no locational context including an unfamiliar place was run-
ning or running outside a dominant behavioral response in the three earthquakes.
Many persons expressed high levels of fear. The Social Breakdown Model suggests that
fear would be associated with ill-considered ﬂight and some of the disaster research litera-
ture implies that self-protective action might be taken despite considerable fear. On the con-
trary, Goltz discovered that as expressed fear increased, so did the propensity to take cover
in the earthquake. The presence and identity of others proved to be an important inﬂuence
on immediate response in the earthquakes; those who were in the presence of dependent
children when the earthquake occurred were more frightened than those who were alone or
with other adults. The presence of dependent children was a signiﬁcant factor in taking
cover and dependent children were typically the objective in the behavior “went to others,”
a behavior characteristic of young married female respondents who were frightened by the
earthquake and clearly acting in a consistent manner with predisaster parental roles.
Remaining in place, which was the behavioral choice of a majority of Loma Prieta and
Northridge respondents, particularly older persons, was quite rare (less than 5%) among
those who were in the presence of dependent children (Goltz 2006).
Some variant of the Modiﬁed Mercalli Intensity (MMI) Scale has been employed for
decades, matching graduated earthquake shaking levels to damage, ground deformation,
and human behavior. The human behavior component portrays increasing levels of percep-
tion of movement and alarm as the intensity of ground shaking increases, and at intensity
VII, declares that “everybody runs outside.” This scale, which was assembled by seismolo-
gists and engineers early in the last century with little, if any, input from social scientists
can be an easy target, but its persistence and probable contribution to stubborn stereotypes
of human behavior in disaster as irrational merits comment in this analysis.
In Goltz’s study of behavioral response in three earthquakes (Whittier Narrows with
MMI up to VIII; Loma Prieta with more widespread MMI VIII and some IX; and North-
ridge also up to MMI IX), the level of shaking intensity was not consistently associated
with any immediate response behavior. The shaking intensity experienced failed to predict
running outside in any of the three earthquakes. Shaking intensity was a very minor inﬂu-
ence on the other behaviors examined, and not a consistent one across the earthquakes stud-
ied. In Northridge, shaking intensity was related to taking cover at home among those who
were in areas exposed to lesser levels of shaking. Although the author hypothesized that
lower intensities might be associated with remaining in place during the earthquakes, inten-
sity did not predict remaining in place in models constructed for any of the three earth-
quakes. Nor was shaking intensity experienced associated with going to others or with
driving behavior.
If we can generalize the ﬁndings above, which are clearly consistent with the Rational-
Adaptive Model of human behavioral response in an earthquake, we can make some general
statements based on empirical evidence about a large earthquake on the San Andreas Fault
in Southern California. Although the M7.8 scenario earthquake is signiﬁcantly larger than
those studied by Goltz and others (with very extensive MMI VIII and IX), the weak rela-
tionship between intensity and response suggests that behavior during the shaking will be
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similar to that reported in earthquakes of lesser magnitude. Thus, we would argue that tak-
ing cover and remaining in place will be the most prevalent actions and that running will be
far less prevalent than suggested by the Social Breakdown Model. The propensity to take
cover is, of course, a learned response and one emphasized in earthquake public education
campaigns such as California’s annual ShakeOut drill, which encourages those who experi-
ence an earthquake to “Drop, Cover, and Hold On.” There is evidence for the efﬁcacy of
such campaigns, though the message must be consistent, repeated, and multichanneled to
ensure consistent compliance. The relatively low death toll for an earthquake of M7.8 can
and has been attributed to California’s stringent building code and programs of hazard miti-
gation, but one must also credit effective public education regarding appropriate and loca-
tion-speciﬁc self-protective actions in an earthquake.
SEARCH AND RESCUE BY SURVIVORS
Search and rescue refers to efforts by organized and spontaneously assembled emergent
groups to locate and extricate persons trapped in debris, administer medical aid if necessary,
and coordinate the transportation of seriously injured persons to hospitals. In the context of
our two models of human behavioral response to disaster, particularly a major disaster like
a M7.8 earthquake in urban Southern California, we would look for either a population trau-
matized into dazed incapacity dependent upon organized response agencies (Social Break-
down Model) or a population operating under an “emergent norm” calling for focused
efforts to assist those in need—ﬁrst family members, then neighbors closely by, followed
by anyone requiring assistance (Rational Adaptive Model). In the immediate aftermath of
an earthquake disaster, a ﬁrst priority would be to assist people injured during the shaking.
Decades of research have demonstrated that in the early stages of a disaster, perhaps
during the ﬁrst 3–6 hours after the earthquake, nearly all search and rescue efforts are per-
formed by family members, neighbors, and community residents in the immediate vicinity
of buildings that have collapsed or partially collapsed. Most of the “live” rescues will be
accomplished in the ﬁrst few hours by these spontaneous search and rescue groups who
work with limited resources and skills but have the advantage of physical proximity to col-
lapsed structures. For example, Hyogo (Japan) Prefectural ofﬁcials estimated that there
were 20,000 live rescues following the Kobe earthquake of 17 January 1995, only 5,000 of
which could be attributed to organized rescue teams and the remainder—75% of the total—
were rescued by other survivors (Goltz 1996). Organized search and rescue teams require
time to mobilize and will be hampered by severe damage to transportation and communica-
tions lifelines, as well as secondary effects of the earthquake including ﬁre following and
potential dam collapse.
Upon the cessation of shaking, people in the Southern California region who have expe-
rienced severe shaking will survey their surroundings; if at work, they will check on the
well-being of their coworkers, if at home, the members of their household, and if in a public
place, others who happen to be in the vicinity. This basic “emergent” norm, calling for as-
sistance to those who have become victims of the earthquake, is highly salient during the
immediate aftermath of the earthquake and provides the motivation for those who have sur-
vived the earthquake with minimal or no injury to devote themselves to those who are in
need of assistance (Drury et al. 2009). This assistance is ﬁrst expressed as a desire to help
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those who are trapped in debris and possibly injured. Most of these early rescues carried out
by spontaneously assembled groups will be relatively uncomplicated, requiring few if any
tools with ﬁrst aid administered by those who happen to be present. If transportation is
available and routes to local hospitals are unencumbered, the injured will be transported to
nearby hospitals.
During the ﬁrst six hours or so, search and rescue by survivors of the earthquake will be
particularly intense in the areas that have experienced the most signiﬁcant ground motion
including eastern Los Angeles County and the cities of San Bernardino, Riverside, Palm
Springs, Lancaster, and Palmdale. Initially, search and rescue will focus on collapsed or par-
tially collapsed multifamily residential buildings and businesses in the older sections of
these cities, but given the relatively unsystematic approach of spontaneously organized
search and rescue groups, activity will be focused on the immediate area in which groups
form rather than according to any plan. For these groups operating in the ﬁrst six hours, the
full extent of the area damaged is unknown, and with limited access to information about
broader impacts, activity is highly localized.
Once locally organized search and rescue teams arrive at the scenes of collapsed struc-
tures, they are likely to encounter ongoing search and rescue efforts by spontaneously
formed groups who provide informal brieﬁngs to the organized teams and continue to work
in cooperation with the organized responders, assume subordinate roles in the effort or rede-
ploy to other collapse scenes where organized teams are not present. In most cases, sponta-
neous teams will have rescued many people trapped in the debris of badly damaged or
collapsed buildings before organized teams appear on the scene due to the length of time
necessary for ofﬁcial teams to mobilize. These rescues will be the less problematic ones that
require minimal skills and simple tools. The remaining rescues which fall to the organized
teams will be more difﬁcult, requiring both training and more specialized rescue equipment.
These rescues are also likely to involve more serious injuries, thus requiring greater on-site
medical expertise and close coordination with emergency vehicles available to transport the
injured to hospitals.
SEEKING INFORMATION
Disaster research has shown that once those who have experienced a sudden onset dis-
aster have ensured their own survival and assisted others in their immediate vicinity, they
typically seek information. In ambiguous situations, the information sought may involve a
credible deﬁnition of what just happened and whether the danger has passed. They certainly
want to know the status of family and friends who may have been affected by the event and
report their own status to those outside the area of impact. In situations in which the disaster
agent is readily identiﬁable, information sought may include an understanding of how
extensive the impact was, how ofﬁcials are responding and how to secure assistance. In
short, people seek to deﬁne the situation.
The immediate sources of information include others who have experienced the event
and the news media of radio, television and newspapers. Social scientists have discovered
that a two-step process is involved in which information is received, mainly from the media
and a second, in which information is discussed and personalized among family, friends
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and signiﬁcant others. The disaster research literature on information seeking addresses the
outputs and internal functioning of news media organizations as well the importance of
informal sources including friends, family members and others present to conﬁrm informa-
tion received, agree on appropriate courses of action and the roles that must be played in
responding to the information received (Turner and Killian 1987). Despite advanced tech-
nology that has magniﬁed the importance of the mass media, “the average person still places
great reliance on an informal network of people whose judgment and opinions are
respected” (op cit, p. 38). Turner et al. (1986) found that while 88% of respondents in a sur-
vey conducted following a local earthquake cited various forms of media as the chief source
of information about the earthquake, over two thirds reported that their source of interpreta-
tion of earthquake information was obtained from friends and coworkers.
In the M7.8 scenario earthquake, we can conﬁdently predict, based on the disaster
research literature, that information seeking will commence immediately after the shaking
stops. The response of persons in close proximity to one another after the shaking has
ceased is to seek information on the wellbeing of others and to assist them, if necessary.
Those who are at work, school, in a public place or preoccupied with assisting others are
unlikely to have immediate access to the media of radio or television while those who are at
home or driving will have more immediate access. In some cases, electric power will be lost
or televisions damaged and television access will be unavailable. In these situations, which
will be particularly salient in the eastern region near the fault, persons will shift to battery-
powered radios for information and news about the earthquake. Whether through television
or radio, early information will be minimal, as radio and television studios will face their
own challenges involving toppled equipment and damage to broadcast infrastructure.
Concurrent with information seeking through the media, persons who have experienced
the earthquake will be engaged in intense discussion of the event, its extent, its impact on
themselves and the immediate environment, and how organized response agencies are or
ought to be assisting them. They will also seek information on the status of family and
friends potentially impacted by the earthquake and seek to reunite with them. Most attempts
to do so will involve telephone contact or computerized media (smart phones or text mes-
saging), which, like radio and television infrastructure, is likely to be disrupted by this
major earthquake. The inability of many to reach family and friends or unite with them will
lead to anxiety, but this anxiety does not lead to incapacity or resignation. Most will persist
until information is received. Within the ﬁrst three to ﬁve hours, as media sources come
back online and word of mouth spreads, people begin to realize the scope of the disaster,
that it was not an isolated event that impacted them but a region-wide disaster and that the
“Big One” had in fact occurred.
As a consequence of this emerging realization, people begin to shift their identiﬁcation
away from themselves as individuals and begin to identify with the entire affected commu-
nity of victims. Although it is likely to take a little longer to reach everyone, this mental
shift begins as a result of media coverage as it becomes available after the main shock.
Those who have experienced the earthquake throughout Southern California will begin to
vigorously discuss reports heard over the media. The resulting “story” based on both media
coverage and widespread discussion about the event will have a larger impact on what peo-
ple think happened than the facts about what actually did happen. In the early phase of the
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disaster, a wide variation in the quality and quantity of information that is made public and
communicated within and across communities in Southern California serve as a basis for
misinformation and rumors.
Rumors are likely to be rampant, and some will be picked up and perpetuated by the
media. These include the social breakdown imagery and stereotypes common in large disasters
and include: fears that the untransported dead will cause disease (despite ofﬁcial information
to the contrary); concerns that looting will become widespread based on isolated observations
of behavior that observers label as looting (that a more critical eye would determine to not be
looting at all); exaggerated estimates of damage and deaths; and that insurance companies will
turn their backs on the victims and not pay for losses (Fischer 1998). Over time, as the media
obtain information from reliable and authoritative sources, most rumors are controlled (though
not all rumors will be controlled per Houts et al. 1988; DiFonzo and Bordia 2006) and the
media shift their focus from the story of the disaster to the provision of emergency-period
instructions that include the location of emergency shelters, how to obtain food and water,
warnings about aftershocks, and how to apply for disaster assistance.
EVACUATION DECISION MAKING
Decisions regarding evacuation will not follow immediately after the earthquake. Those
whose homes have been damaged will be concerned ﬁrst with their own safety and that of
family members who are not present. Once united, families will assess the situation and
base their decision to leave or remain in their homes on several factors—the level of dam-
age, the type and number of utility outages, their emotional state and the actions taken, or
perception of the actions taken, by neighbors. Clearly, not all post-earthquake evacuations
will be discretionary, as severe damage, hazardous materials releases, potential dam failure
and ﬁre, or the likelihood of ﬁre, will prompt evacuations ordered by authorities.
The disaster research literature points to a number of factors that guide evacuation deci-
sion making. At the outset however, it must be said that mass evacuations from an earth-
quake disaster, even a disaster on the regional scale considered in this scenario, to other
regions and even other states, are extremely unlikely. On a basic level, some people evacu-
ate their homes and others do not but few will abandon their homes, friends and commun-
ities to take up residence, even temporary residence, in other parts of the country. This
assumption which has become conventional wisdom emerged from Hurricane Katrina in
which it was indeed necessary to move large numbers of people out of New Orleans and
relocate them to other areas. This disaster involved inundation of large portions of the city,
loss of utilities and a virtual cessation of economic activity as well as a near total disruption
of community activities. An earthquake, even one as large and damaging as a southern San
Andreas event will not devastate the entire region and there will be areas that will have min-
imal structural damage, brief utility outages and will resume normal economic and commu-
nity activities soon after the earthquake. Thus, earthquake induced evacuations will typi-
cally be local (to the homes of relatives or friends, nearby hotels or ofﬁcial shelters) and
short-term (with the notable exception of those whose homes have been destroyed by ﬁre).
Variables that inﬂuence evacuation decision making include situational, perceptual,
emotional, and demographic factors. Situational factors include the level of structural and
nonstructural damage to one’s home, utility outages, and accessibility issues (e.g., level of
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service disruption, road and street closures, loss of local economic activity, etc.). Perceptu-
ally, the response of people facing evacuation decisions is inﬂuenced by advisories and
recommendations of ofﬁcials, an assessment of personal risk, past experience with similar
disasters, urging of relatives, the actions of neighbors and self-perception as a “victim” (as
summarized in Mileti 1999; Goltz 2006). The emotional states of persons will also impact
evacuation decisions. Goltz found in the Whittier Narrows, Loma Prieta and Northridge
earthquakes that those who were most fearful during the earthquake, reported “emotional
injuries” from the event, or expressed a strong desire to be in the company of others were
more likely to evacuate than those for whom these factors were less salient (2006).
Several demographic variables have also been associated with evacuation behavior.
Age, gender, ethnicity, household size, education, and income have all been found to inﬂu-
ence evacuation behavior, though not consistently so. Studies have suggested that advanced
age, larger household size, being male, belonging to a minority ethnicity, and having lower
levels of education and income have been associated with the tendency not to evacuate,
while younger persons, small households, being female, being Caucasian, and having
higher income and education have been associated with the propensity to evacuate follow-
ing disasters.
When people evacuate, they typically do so as family units, and evacuating families
usually drive private vehicles to alternate shelter and may move from one place of tempo-
rary shelter to another. Deﬁnitions of the “family unit” for evacuees may include pets.
Among pets, dogs are the most likely to be taken with the evacuating family, and pets left
behind may be motivating factors for people to return home after evacuating. The homes of
relatives are preferred to public shelters when they are located a reasonable distance from
the disaster site. Those who populate public shelters are typically older and lower in socioe-
conomic status (Mileti et al. 1992). Research has also suggested that those who have evac-
uated make their own decisions as to when to return home, a process that does not always
coincide with ofﬁcial recommendations and may result in inconvenience if services have
not been fully restored as well as an increased probability of injury or death during cleanup
(Quarantelli 1980, Dow and Cutter 2000, Siebeneck and Cova 2008).
In the scenario of a M7.8 earthquake in Southern California, evacuations will take place
over the ﬁrst several days following the earthquake. In the eastern portions of Los Angeles
County, the cities of San Bernardino and Riverside, and the desert cities of the Coachella
Valley, large numbers of people whose homes have been seriously damaged and are with-
out electricity, water, and natural gas are likely to evacuate on the day of the earthquake and
seek shelter with friends and relatives whose homes have not been damaged. Debris in the
streets, nonfunctioning trafﬁc signals, and damage to bridges will limit the mobility of
many who wish to leave the immediate area, and some will either remain close to their dam-
aged homes or relocate to public shelters, which will open during the late afternoon of the
ﬁrst day.
Early evacuees may set up shelters in parks or open spaces before ofﬁcial shelters are
opened and some will remain in these locations rather than move again. Initially, shelters
house only a few evacuees but as ﬁres spread and dam-related evacuations are ordered,
more and more people will arrive and more shelters will be opened during the ﬁrst week af-
ter the earthquake. Shortages of food, water, and medicine cause some discontent at the
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shelters, but overall, evacuees are compliant with shelter rules and are cooperative and will-
ing to volunteer when needed. The buildings and open areas selected for shelters are varied
and include neighborhood schools, churches, recreation centers, nonessential government
buildings, parks, vacant lots, and fairgrounds. Where buildings are not available, tents sup-
plied by the National Guard are erected in parks and at fairgrounds.
Millions of people would be impacted by the scenario earthquake, and a large subset of
them in the eight-county region whose homes have been damaged and are without utilities
will remain on the property surrounding their homes rather than seek shelter elsewhere.
Many fear that their homes will be looted if they leave, have no relatives or friends nearby
who might offer them refuge, and reject the idea of going to a public shelter. Although they
do not require overnight accommodation at shelters, this population, which may eventually
number 2.5 million, makes demands on mass-care resources as supplies of water, food,
medication, and sanitary supplies are exhausted. By the third day after the earthquake,
response ofﬁcials establish “points of distribution“ adjacent to shelters and adjust resource
requests to local EOCs to assure adequate supplies for this in situ evacuation population.
Many families who have evacuated or are considering evacuation must make decisions
regarding their pets and animals. Some ofﬁcial shelters accept pets, while others do not, and
emergency operations center staff work with local animal care and control ofﬁcials to iden-
tify animal shelters, veterinary hospitals, boarding kennels, pet stores, and fairground facili-
ties to house animals that shelters are unwilling or incapable of accepting. Some evacuees
resort to unofﬁcial shelters or decide to remain on their property due to concerns about the
care and safety of their pets. In response to the issues of pet care, EOCs launch public infor-
mation bulletins asking evacuees to consider their pets in evacuation decisions, provide
locations where pets can be housed and assign personnel to shelters to act as referral sources
for animal care operations.
The percentage of victims needing public shelter is larger in this earthquake than other
disasters due to several factors: Extensive urban ﬁres have destroyed thousands of residen-
tial units to which evacuees cannot return; many victims of the earthquake are low- income
people who have fewer options for alternate shelter; widespread utility outages have made it
difﬁcult to inhabit homes that may have suffered only minimal damage; and the many large
aftershocks (including some that are greater than M6) have magniﬁed fears that consider-
able danger remains and fuel discomfort in remaining in structures that may be further dam-
aged or collapse. In addition, hundreds of thousands of commuters have been stranded on
roads and freeways and require at least temporary shelter.
As a result of earthquake damage, widespread utility outages, fear, and discomfort due to
ongoing large aftershocks, extensive ﬁres, and a potential dam collapse, more than 255,000
households or as many as three quarters of a million people have been displaced from their
homes in the eight-county area affected by the M7.8 earthquake. In some cases, those who
have left their homes will return within a week; however, extensive ﬁre damage will necessi-
tate at least short-term shelter for approximately 542,000 people. Over a thousand public
shelters will be necessary to house the large number of people who cannot ﬁnd shelter else-
where, mainly with relatives, friends, and in hotels in the region (Jones et al. 2008, Southern
California Catastrophic Earthquake Response Plan, IWG6 Staff Estimate, 2010).
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TAKING OTHER RESPONSE ACTIONS
Many of the tasks typically addressed by emergency response organizations immedi-
ately after the impact of a disaster go unaddressed because the demand for service delivery
far exceeds the capacities of response organizations. Resulting emergency response voids
do not go unaddressed since surviving victims rally to address them until outside mutual aid
response organizations can converge on the area. Nine response areas where this occurs are
described in the text which follows. These are: (1) ﬁre suppression, (2) trafﬁc control and
route recovery, (3) ﬁrst aid and transport of the injured, (4) sheltering, (5) food and water,
(6) property protection and law enforcement, (7) dealing with the dead, (8) cleaning up de-
bris, and (9) donations.
FIRE SUPPRESSION
In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, overturned heat sources (lamps, candles,
kitchen burners, and more), abraded and shorted electrical wiring, spilled chemicals,
sheared natural gas lines, and other sources, cause hundreds of ﬁres around the region. The
density of ﬁres is higher in mobile home parks than in neighborhoods comprised of conven-
tional single-family homes due to the serious vulnerability to ﬁre of manufactured homes
(Lindell and Perry 1997). Initially, some ﬁres are suppressed by residents and people at
work with ﬁre extinguishers and available water sources; however, many more ﬁres will
require trained ﬁre ﬁghters with appropriate equipment to be effectively extinguished. If at
home, ﬁre ﬁghters will converge to their stations to assist their colleagues on duty. Due to
telecommunications damage and saturation of the few working phone lines, many calls to
ﬁre departments will be delayed, not get through, or are never made. In some cases, resi-
dents may be able to reach close-by ﬁre stations by foot in time to summon ﬁre ﬁghters, but
the volume of ﬁres, delays, and distance will mean that small ﬁres will grow into large
ones. In other cases, ﬁre ﬁghters will self-dispatch to an observed smoke column. Within
hours, some survivors will ﬁnd themselves assisting available organized ﬁre ﬁghters, and
many survivors will monitor their surroundings for new ﬁres for days and weeks, particu-
larly because of aftershocks.
TRAFFIC CONTROL AND ROUTE RECOVERY
Initial post-impact travel will be to reunite family members and other intimates. People
will use personal vehicles, and parents will attempt to pick up children at schools and day
care centers. Most encounter obstacles and trafﬁc jams. Some commuters on the road during
impact are stranded due to debris and damage. Some survivors direct trafﬁc in damaged
areas. There are attempts to rescue stranded motorists where driving is impossible, but after
trying to use their cell phones to call for help, many commuters abandon their vehicles and
walk to the nearest facilities; yet others stay with their vehicles. Once operational, both
Emergency Operations Centers and route recovery agencies (e.g., in California these agen-
cies include the California Department of Transportation, the California Highway Patrol,
local government public works agencies and other similar agencies) become aware of the
problem posed by stranded motorists. Many motorists are rescued or have found their way
to another location by the end of the ﬁrst day. In the less-damaged areas, some local streets
will have been cleared in the same time frame. Many survivors innovate ways to commute
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in spite of obstacles including the use of bicycles and 4-wheel drive vehicles. There is very
limited motorized mobility in the hardest hit areas due to the extensive damage, and local
trafﬁc is largely limited to emergency vehicles, and people desperately attempting to reunite
with family members and intimates. We would speculate that commuting will increase after
three days in less-damaged areas as streets and roads are cleared of debris and people travel
to get supplies, sightsee, check on and visit with others, and obtain items from stores that
have now opened. There is little route recovery a week after the earthquake in the hardest-
hit areas.
FIRST AID AND TRANSPORT OF THE INJURED
Many people are unharmed, but many others are injured. People initially check for inju-
ries to themselves and those in close proximity. Aid is given to the injured to the extent that
it can be provided, given limited resources and expertise. Within the ﬁrst half hour, those
with medical training will volunteer and provide assistance to the injured on site, while
others do not out of a concern for liability. First aid that can be administered onsite is com-
pleted within the ﬁrst couple of hours. People with medical training and off-site staff try to
report to medical centers and hospitals to volunteer for service. Many do so, but many in
the hardest hit areas can not because of roadway damage. Medical staff frustration rises
over the growing lack of resources. By the end of the ﬁrst day, many patients have arrived
at medical facilities transported by those who were with them when the earthquake struck.
The injured are transported to facilities that those transporting them know about which
results in an uneven distribution of patient load across facilities. Most medical staff on duty
when the earthquake struck will still there after 24 hours. They have worked at capacity,
have not slept, and most of them have found ways to get information to and from family
members and intimates without leaving their posts. Many days later, survivors continue to
give ﬁrst aid in neighborhoods and continue to attempt to transport injured to hospitals de-
spite road obstacles because of continued injuries from aftershocks and clean-up accidents.
FOOD ANDWATER
Food and water are not a major immediate problem. Most people will have some stored
food and water, and others will get drinkable water from their hot water heaters. But these
supplies will dwindle. In three days, many will have exhausted their food supplies; and
water, in many cases, will be needed even sooner. Food and water will be provided as part
of shelter operations, but delivery of these resources will be hampered in severely damaged
areas; these are eastern Los Angeles County, the cities of San Bernardino and Riverside,
and the desert cities in the Coachella Valley. People in these areas will look to local govern-
ments for supplies. Some will go to damaged grocery and convenience stores to collect
what they need to survive. Some of them will be labeled as looters by local media and
authorities. Others with supply stockpiles share what they have with others. A few people
will sell supplies and water at greatly inﬂated prices. Food and water will be more problem-
atic in informal versus organized shelters since they will not be known to authorities. Dona-
tions will begin arriving in less-damaged areas soon after the earthquake, but they will need
to be managed and distributed at the local level. Drinking water will be a very high priority
and pose an acute problem because of many breaks in water pipes that will require lengthy
extensive repairs and because available water will be needed to ﬁght the many ﬁres that are
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burning throughout the region. Areas with minimal damage will provide some drinking
water to heavily damaged areas; it will not be sufﬁcient and a major effort will be mobilized
to transport water by land, sea, and air.
PROPERTY PROTECTION AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
Within the ﬁrst two hours after the event, some people develop concern over the lack of
protection from the perceived risk of looting. This concern grows after 24 hours among
many survivors in damaged areas from sporadic reports of looting in the media and hearing
rumors of looting as survivors tell each other stories they have heard from other survivors.
Maintaining order will become the prime concern of local law enforcement agencies. The
fear of looting will be far greater than the few isolated looting cases that occur; nevertheless,
looting concerns will be real to those who have them and will inhibit some from leaving
their damaged property to relocate to shelters. In other cases, these concerns cause families
to separate as those responsible for businesses go there to protect their inventories. After
several days, people in unplanned shelters will provide their own security, and there will be
scattered reports of abuse toward volunteers providing security in some of these shelters.
Regular law enforcement agencies will provide security in planned shelters. After a week,
the National Guard will have taken over most control and security work from local law
enforcement agencies.
DEALINGWITH THE DEAD
Grief-stricken families will demand proper care of dead loved ones, and the ability of
mortuaries and religious organizations to operate are hampered by damage and because
service demand far exceeds capacity. Within a day, attention will focus on collapsed high-
rise buildings. A massive demand will rise to learn about loved ones in those buildings.
Some dead are identiﬁed within the ﬁrst 24 hours as search and rescue teams report to
Emergency Operations Centers. Surviving family members begin to make arrangements for
burials. Related activities include: picking up the body, notifying family members, funeral
home arrangements, and so on. The process is slowed in hard-hit areas due to volume. After
a week, families remain focused on processing their dead. Convergence of others from out-
side the area to commemorate the dead and grieve must be anticipated.
CLEANING UP DEBRIS
Survivors will quickly remove debris in their immediate area as soon as the ground
stops shaking and, then, quickly start removing debris necessary to extract trapped victims.
Several hours later and where search and rescue was not needed, the focus will shift to
clearing debris from around households, worksites, and to salvage needed resources. Within
a day or two, survivors who experienced lesser impacts and with inhabitable homes will
have completed much of the debris removal needed to clear their houses and offer assistance
to ofﬁcial debris removal efforts in their neighborhoods.
DONATIONS
A few hours after the earthquake, many victims will think about what they will need to
survive over the next few days. By the end of the ﬁrst day, local food retailers and
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restaurants will have donated food, water, and services to victims and begun to work with
NGOs and government response organizations to identify priorities for the distribution of
supplies and water. Businesses in the affected region will continue to donate resources to
survivors for many days, and volunteers approach NGOs to assist with donation manage-
ment and distribution. By the end of the ﬁrst week, volunteers from across the nation will
approach national non-governmental organizations to volunteer their services. In the days
and weeks following the earthquake, given the size of the disaster and coverage in media
around the world, donations will arrive in the region, some of which will be appropriate and
needed, while others will be useless and discarded (Dynes 1970, McEntire 2007).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We have drawn on the extensive social science literature on disasters to portray human
behavior in response to a large regional earthquake scenario for Southern California. In
many respects, readers may be surprised by how this behavior has been described, as it may
contradict long-held assumptions about how ordinary people would react to a very extraor-
dinary event. We have examined several actions including initial behavioral response,
search and rescue, information seeking and evacuation decision making in some detail, and
other actions, including ﬁre suppression, trafﬁc control and route recovery, ﬁrst aid and
transport of the injured, the provision of food and water, property protection and law
enforcement, handling of the dead, debris clearance, and donations of resources in brief
summary form. While all of these actions are regarded as the domain of ofﬁcial response
agencies, we have shown that earthquake survivors share in these actions, and in many
instances, perform these functions effectively prior to the arrival of organized responders.
As a foundation for our description of public response to the M7.8 earthquake disaster,
we cited empirical evidence from the social science literature to establish that response of
the public impacted by the disaster would be controlled, rational, constructive and consist-
ent with pre-disaster roles in contrast to widely held assumptions that it will be impulsive,
irrational, predatory or overly dependent on organizations charged with disaster response.
We also noted that human behavioral response follows a certain pattern, beginning with the
need to respond to the sudden onset of ground motion, which in some areas will be
extremely strong, followed by the provision of assistance to others, seeking information,
and making decisions regarding whether it is safe to remain in ones home or seek shelter
elsewhere. In applying research ﬁndings to a large Southern California earthquake scenario,
we concluded that the vast majority of Southern Californians will respond adaptively to the
onset of the earthquake by taking cover and avoiding hazards, then actively assist others in
the immediate area and attempt to use the media to learn more about what happened and
how to obtain assistance. They will also assess their living arrangements, based on situa-
tional considerations of damage, utilities, and accessibility; perceptual factors including the
recommendations of ofﬁcials, the urging of others, personal risk perceptions and emotional
states; and demographic characteristics (age, gender, ethnicity, household size, education
and income), decide whether they will remain in their homes or seek shelter elsewhere.
In the hours and days following the earthquake, survivors will actively perform func-
tions normally the domain of ﬁre, police, medical professionals and other emergency res-
ponders due to inevitable delays in mobilization of an organized response and the sheer
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magnitude of the disaster. In some areas such as the Coachella Valley, San Bernardino and
Riverside, the response of community volunteers may be the only response in the ﬁrst few
days following the event. This emergent response will be most signiﬁcant in search and res-
cue as those best positioned to respond are already in the immediate proximity of those
needing rescue. As organized responders arrive and become active, informal teams of vol-
unteers will assist them or move to other areas where they will remain active until sidelined
by physical exhaustion or the arrival of response agencies. Our depiction of public response
to disaster also has an important implication for efforts by government agencies and non-
governmental organizations to promote earthquake safety and community resilience. If
members of the public can be relied upon to be an asset in disasters, and we have estab-
lished that they are, then investment in activities like ShakeOut, ﬁrst aid, CPR and CERT
training, and other hazard education efforts are certainly justiﬁed.
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